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The Northern Ireland Broadcasting Ban:
Some Reflections on Judicial Review
Russell L. Weaver*
Geoffrey Bennett**
ABSTRACT
This Essay initially examines the British government's ban on its
broadcasting networks that restricts coverage of Northern Ireland orga-
nizations, and concludes by making some reflections on the system of ju-
dicial review in the United States. Professors Weaver and Bennett note
that a comparable ban in the United States probably would be held un-
constitutional. In Great Britain, however, the courts lack a similar power
of judicial review, leaving the question of the Ban's legitimacy to the po-
litical process. While Great Britain enjoys a relatively free society, the
authors conclude that government control over the British media poses
troubling problems and suggests that the system of judicial review in the
United States cannot be said to be unnecessary.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Marbury v. Madison,1 which established the United States judiciary's
right to review the constitutionality of legislative and executive action,'
has stirred controversy for nearly two centuries.3 Marbury's critics ask
whether in a representative democracy, the judiciary, which is unelected
and therefore less politically accountable than either the President or
Congress in the United States, should invalidate legislative or executive
action.4 The debate invites comparison with other countries that lack a
comparable judicial review system. In Britain, in particular, it is un-
thinkable for a court to strike down an act on the ground that Parlia-
ment had exceeded its authority.5 Some commentators have asked
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. For an introduction to the United States system of judicial review, see 1 R. RO-
TUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 1.1-1.6
(1986) [hereinafter NOWAK] and L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-208
(2d. ed. 1988).
3. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Corwin, Marbury v.
Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review, 12 MICH. L. REV. 538 (1914); Frank-
furter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARv. L. REV. 217 (1955); Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1; Wechsler, To-
ward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
4. See L. HAND, THE BILL Or RIGHTS 11-18 (1958); Wechsler, supra note 3, at 2-
10.
5. See S.A. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 27 (5th ed.
1985) ("Parliament as a legislative body can enact any law whatsoever on any subject
whatsoever in the eyes of United Kingdom courts, according to the generally held view.
Changes in rules of constitutional law can be. effected by ordinary legislation"). See also
Cappalletti, Fundamental Guarantees of the Parties in Civil Litigation: Comparative
Constitutional, International, and Social Trends, 25 STAN. L. REV. 651, 654-55
(1973). Invariably, attempts to challenge the validity of statutes have failed. In Pickin v.
British Railways Board 1974 App. Cas. 765, the House of Lords rejected an allegation
that Parliament had been misled by fraudulent misrepresentations into passing a statute,
thus making the Act invalid. Lord Reid stated:
For a century or more both Parliament and the courts have been careful not to
act so as to cause conflict between them. Any such investigations as the respondent
seeks could easily lead to such a conflict .... [T]he whole trend of authority for
over a century is clearly against permitting any such investigation.
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whether the experience in other countries demonstrates that judicial re-
view is unnecessary.6
How well do other systems function without judicial review? Britain
provides an interesting example. One asserted advantage of judicial re-
view is that it restricts governmental power and helps guarantee individ-
ual liberties. Even without judicial review, Britain is a relatively free
society. Britian, in various levels of protection, recognizes most rights
that are deemed fundamental in the United States, including freedom of
the press,7 freedom of religion,' freedom of speech,9 and the right to due
process of law.' Britain also recognizes many criminal rights protected
in the United States, including the privilege against self-incrimination"
and the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 2 But,
notwithstanding these protections, Britain is a more restrictive society
than the United States. For example, although the British Government
recognizes freedom of expression and freedom of the press, it can and
does place more serious restrictions on public debate than permitted in
the United States.'" In addition, although Britain also recognizes the
Id. at 788. Neither is an assertion that a statute is contrary to international law a ground
for impugning the statute. See Mortensen v. Peters, 14 Scots L. Times Rep. 227 (H.C.J.
1906); Cheney v. Conn [1968] 1 W.L.R. 242, 245. Ultra vires arguments have been no
more successful. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
6. See NOWAK, supra note 2, §§ 1.2, 1.4; L. TRIBE, supra note 2, § 3.2, at 25 n.10.
("The fact that the people established a government of limited powers does not of neces-
sity mean that they established a single document to control the action of their own
democratic process. It is at least possible that the legislature was to be guided by these
principles, while it was free to interpret them for itself and to have its acts respected by
the other branches of government. Marshall, [in Marbury v. Madison], however, sought
to shore up the argument by finding that the essence of a written Constitution is that it is
to be a fundamental and binding document. Once again, this conclusion is not necessarily
true; other nations have employed written Constitutions as general principles for govern-
ment which are not enforced by the judicial departments against acts of other branches of
the government." (Comparison with Canada)).
7. See S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at 482-89.
8. Id. at 481-82.
9. Id. at 481-504.
10. Id. at 582-97.
11. See C. EMMINS, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 397-407 (4th ed. 1988); C. HAMPTON,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 181-89 (1973).
12. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, ch. 60, § 8. See also S.A. DE SMITH,
supra note 5, at 476-80.
13. See infra notes 15-30, 75-101, 130-56 and accompanying text. See also Bevan,
The Recent Decline and Fall of Freedom of the Press in English Law, 16 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 31 (1983).
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right to silence, it has substantially curtailed that right. 14
This Essay initially focuses on how the British system of government
functions without judicial review; specifically how does it curb
governmental power and preserve individual and press freedom? The
Essay examines these issues in the context of the British Government's
decision to prohibit radio and television networks from airing interviews
or statements by members of certain Northern Ireland organizations, or
by allies and sympathizers of such organizations (the Broadcasting Ban
or Ban). From an analysis of that Ban, some conclusions are drawn
about the system of judicial review as it exists in the United States.
II. THE BROADCASTING BAN
A. The Home Secretary's Orders
The Broadcasting Ban was imposed on October 19, 1988.15 It took the
form of two virtually identical orders issued, respectively, to Britain's
two broadcasting networks-the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) and the Independent Broadcast Authority (IBA).16 The orders
prohibit both organizations from airing any words spoken by a person
who is a member of a restricted organization, or who solicits or invites
14. On October 19, 1988, Britain's Home Secretary announced that he intended to
restrict the right to remain silent and that he was restricting that right in Northern
Ireland effective immediately. Jenkins & Hutchings, 88 Ways to Lose Your Liberty,
NEW STATESMAN & SOCIETY, Dec. 2, 1988, at 34. In any of several enumerated situa-
tions, silence may be treated as an admission of guilt, and even the failure to offer a
believable explanation upon leaving a crime scene may be used by the prosecution to
show guilt. ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 1988, at 63. The Home Secretary also announced that
he planned to ask Parliament to extend these restrictions to the United Kingdom as a
whole. Times (London), Oct. 21, 1988, at 1, cols. 3-5; id. at 24, cols. 7-8.
The legal position of Northern Ireland is somewhat anomalous. It is subject to direct
rule under the Northern Ireland Act 1974 as a result of the failure of various constitu-
tional initiatives taken after the collapse of the Stormont Parliament, which had been
dominated by Protestant unionists. Thus, although Northern Ireland returns members of
Parliament to Westminster, its system of government differs radically from that of the
rest of the United Kingdom. It would not be possible for a government minister to im-
pose these restrictions elsewhere in the same manner or with the same speed with which
they were imposed in Northern Ireland.
15. Int'l Herald Tribune, Oct. 20, 1988, at 2, cols. 1-5.
16. The IBA, separate from the BBC, has the duty to "provide ... television and
local sound broadcasting services." Broadcasting Act 1981, ch. 68, § 2. It governs the
independent channels, which include channel three (ITV) and channel four. See id. § 10
(providing authority for channel 4). The total effect of the orders, therefore, covers all
television broadcasting in the United Kingdom.
[Vol. 22.1119
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support for a restricted organization. 17 The list of restricted organiza-
tions includes the Irish Republican Army (IRA), thJIrish National Lib-
eration Army (INLA), Cumann na mBann (the women's movement),
Fianna Eireann (the youth movement), Saor Eire (Free Ireland), Ulster
Freedom Fighters (UFF), Red Hand Commando, Ulster Volunteer
Force (UVF), Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein, and the Ulster Defense
Association (UDA).'8
The Government offered two justifications for the Ban. First, it be-
lieved that members and supporters of restricted organizations were
making offensive statements on the air. Home Secretary Douglas Hurd,
in explaining the Ban, noted:
When you had a bomb outrage, and there are pictures of bodies to dis-
tressed and weeping relatives, and the next thing that happens on the
screen, in people's living rooms, is somebody saying, "I support the armed
struggle" or "They deserved it"-that I think is not only offensive, but it's
17. The IBA order stated that:
1. In pursuance of section 29(3) of the Broadcasting Act 1981, I hereby require
the Independent Broadcasting Authority to refrain from broadcasting any matter
which consists of or includes -
any words spoken, whether in the course of an interview or discussion or
otherwise, by a person who appears or is heard on the programme in which
the matter is broadcast where -
(a) the person speaking the words represents or purports to represent an
organization specified in paragraph 2 below, or
(b) the words support or solicit or invite support for such an organization,
other than any matter specified in paragraph 3 below.
2. The organizations referred to in paragraph 1 above are -
(a) any organization which is for the time being a proscribed organization
for the purposes of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act
1984 or the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978; and
(b) Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein and the Ulster Defense Association.
3. The matter excluded from paragraph 1 above is any words spoken -
(a) in the course of proceedings in Parliament, or,
(b) by or in support of a candidate at a parliamentary, European Parlia-
mentary or local election pending that election.
IBA Order (Oct. 19, 1988) [hereinafter IBA Order] (available from the British Home
Office Ministry. 50 Queen Anne's Gate London, SWIH 9AT, (01) 273-4635). The
BBC order was substantially identical except that it did not contain the exemption for
"proceedings in Parliament." BBC Order (Oct. 19, 1988) [hereinafter BBC Order] (also
available from the British Home Office Ministry). The BBC interpreted its order as
including that exemption. BBC Guidelines, 2 (1982) (issued in light of a Home office
letter clarifying the original orders; available from BBC) [hereinafter BBC Guidelines].
18. See BBC and IBA Orders, supra note 17, para. 2. BBC and IBA guidelines
interpreted the Orders to include the groups listed above. See, e.g., BBC Guidelines,
supra note 17, at 2.
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wrong and it's perfectly reasonable to remove that.19
The Government felt that the public should be insulated from such state-
ments.20 The other reason, which did not emerge until a few weeks later,
was that the Government wanted to deprive the restricted speakers of
'stature'. 2  The Government believed that those who are allowed to
speak on radio or television gain an aura of authority by their appear-
ance. When terrorists are allowed to appear, and to gain this stature, the
"ripple of fear" increases in the community.2 2
The orders provided for certain exemptions. The Ban did not apply to
words spoken "by or in support of a candidate at a parliamentary, Euro-
pean Parliamentary or local election pending that election."213 In addi-
tion, it did not apply to words spoken "in the course of proceedings in
Parliament. '24 But the Ban did extend to statements made in other legis-
lative bodies in the United Kingdom, as well as to statements made in
the European Parliament or in the legislative body of any foreign coun-
try.2' The Ban also extended to statements made in judicial proceedings
19. Int'l Herald Tribune, Oct. 20, 1988, at 2, col. 3.
20. Times (London), Oct. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 1. In a recently released report on
broadcasting, the Government argued that statements by members and supporters of re-
stricted organizations had "caused offense to many viewers and listeners." Secretary of
State for the Home Department, Broadcasting in the '90s: Competition, Choice and
Quality 36 (1988) [hereinafter Broadcasting White Paper] (presentation to Parliament).
See also 139 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 1081-82 (1988).
21. 139 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 1082 (1988).
22. In the House of Commons debate concerning the Ban, Home Secretary Douglas
Hurd argued that "direct access gives those who use it an air and appearance of author-
ity which spreads further outward the ripple of fear that terrorist acts create in the
community." 139 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 1082 (1988).
23. BBC and IBA Orders, supra note 17, para. 3.
24. This exemption was expressly stated in the order issued to the IBA, but not in
the order issued to the BBC. IBA Order, supra note 17, para. 3. Nevertheless, BBC
guidelines interpreted the order as including this exemption of the Westminster Parlia-
ment. BBC Guidelines, supra note 17, at 3. The Home Secretary similarly interpreted
the order. House of Commons, 139 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 1076 (1988).
25. Although the Home Secretary's Orders of October 19 did not expressly set forth
this limitation, it seems to be implicit. Moreover, the BBC Guidelines interpreted the
Ban in that way. The Guidelines stated that:
Actuality from the European Parliament is not exempt from the restrictions. If [a
Member of the Eurpean Parliament] speaks in support of say the UDA during
Parliamentary business our programmes cannot use the actuality of those com-
ments .... The same restriction applies to Parliaments in any foreign country.
BBC Guidelines, supra note 17, at 3. See also IBA Guidelines, 2 (Oct. 21, 1988) [here-
inafter IBA Guidelines].
[Vol. 22.1119
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in the United Kingdom, or in any foreign country.26
B. Subsequent Interpretations
After the Ban took effect, the British media struggled to determine its
meaning. The orders put the media in a difficult position because they
were worded very broadly. In addition, many of the restricted organiza-
tions were legal organizations, and some members of those organizations
were elected officials. Could elected officials who belonged to restricted
organizations be interviewed on matters within the scope of their elected
duties? Could elected officials speak out on the issues generally? In one
instance, a local elected official who was a member of Sinn Fein wanted
to comment on the Ban's impact. She wished to state that the Ban was
preventing her from speaking out on important public issues (for exam-
ple, should a hospital be closed). The IBA concluded that it should not
air the statement.2
On October 25, a week after the Ban was imposed, the Home Secre-
tary issued a letter clarifying the Ban's meaning and scope.2s Although
26. Once again, the orders did not expressly prohibit the airing of such statements.
The BBC Guidelines stated that:
Court proceedings should there be actuality of them are not exempt ....
[Aictuality from a court in the United States, for instance, would be restricted if it
included someone speaking in support of one of the affected organizations.
BBC Guidelines, supra note 17, at 3. See also IBA, Broadcasting and Terrorism: Home
Secretary's Direction 2 (Oct. 25, 1988) [hereinafter IBA Revised Guidelines.].
27. Interview with Mr. David Glencross, IBA's Director of Television, (Nov. 23,
1988) [hereinafter Glencross Interview].,See also 139 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 1084
(1988).
28. A copy of the October 25 clarification could not be obtained; however, a second
clarification letter, issued November 9, 1988, provided:
Thank you for your letter of 1 November about the application to archive material
of the Notice issued under section 29(3) of the Broadcasting Act.
As my officials have indicated, the Notice does apply to radio and television mate-
rial recorded before the Notice was issued. Having decided to impose restrictions
on personal appearances by representatives of the organizations and their support-
ers, it would not have been sensible to distinguish between such appearances made
before the cameras last year and those that might take place in the future. Not all
archive material will, of course, be caught by the restrictions, and programme-
makers will have to use their editorial judgment in excluding any that is. Any
statements that are so excluded can still be reported and drawn upon in the course
of the programme.
Now that the Notice has been issued and a full explanation of its intention and
effect provided by my officials, I think for the time being it must be for the
1989]
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the letter was not made public and the Home Office refused to release a
copy of the clarification, some insight into the letter's content can be
gleaned from BBC and IBA statements issued after, and in light of, the
clarification.2" Both the BBC and IBA believed that the Home Office
would allow broadcasters to show some statements made by elected offi-
cials, whether or not those officials were members or supporters of a
restricted organization, provided that the statements did not proclaim
support for one of the restricted organizations.30 But confusion remained
over exactly which statements were exempt. The IBA believed that a
statement by an elected official who ran for office on the ticket of a re-
stricted organization would be precluded. It reasoned that one who was
elected on a Sinn Fein ticket would be presumed to be speaking on be-
half of Sinn Fein when discussing public issues."' The BBC inter-
preted the Ban more narrowly. Its position was that a councillor could
express opinions on local matters so long as the concillor did not express
support for a restricted organization or its aims.32 The IBA and BBC
agreed that a Sinn Fein councillor who appeared on behalf of a council
to explain the council's decision would be allowed to speak. 3
Authority to proceed to apply it in practice and gain first-hand experience of its
operation. I have, as you know, given an undertaking to the House of Commons
that we shall keep the operation of the Notice under careful review.
Letter from Home Secretary Douglas Hurd to The Rt. Hon. Lord Thomson of
Monifieth, Kt., Chairman, IBA (Nov. 9, 1988) [hereinafter Hurd Letter].
29. See, e.g., BBC Guidelines, supra note 17; IBA Revised Guidelines, supra note
26.
30. Broadcasting and Terrorism: Home Secretary's Direction (Oct. 25, 1988). (IBA
internal document, prepared by Mr. R. Hargreaves, the IBA's Chief Assistant for Tele-
vision.) Telephone conversation with Anonymous BBC Official [hereinafter Anonymous
Interview].
31. Glencross Interview, supra note 27. Home Secretary Douglas Hurd made this
point in the House of Commons debate on the Ban:
One . . . issue concerns the question whether a person is representing a named
organisation at the time he appears on a programme. It is true that members of an
organisation cannot be held to represent it in all his daily activities .... The key
to the issue is the word "represent." When a councillor is speaking in Northern
Ireland, it is not the subject about which he is talking that will decide whether his
speech can be broadcast directly, but whether he is talking on behalf of one of the
named organizations ....
As the director of Radio 4 made clear this morning - although he did not like
it - a Sinn Fein councillor speaking about council matters on behalf of his group
will not be allowed direct access.
139 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 1078 (1988).
32. Anonymous Interview, supra note 30.
33. The BBC Guidelines provided that:
[Vol. 22.1119
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The clarification letter also provided greater insight into the Home
Office's objectives. Both sets of guidelines suggested that the Home Office
was principally concerned about giving members or supporters of re-
stricted organizations direct access to television or radio. In other words,
the Government did not want such individuals actually being shown
making statements on television or on radio. Indirect access, however,
was permissible. Broadcasters could quote verbatim from statements so
long as they did not show the statements actually being made. In addi-
tion, broadcasters could show a picture of a person and provide a sum-
mary of what was said. 4
Whether the clarification letter dealt with the question of who would
be deemed a "supporter" of a restricted organization is unclear. Under a
literal interpretation of the orders, broadcasters could not directly air
There is one other main aspect of the changed interpretation which will affect
programmes, especially in Northern Ireland. It concerns the possibility of appear-
ances by Sinn Fein councillors and other people who at times represent one of the
affected organizations. To take an example: the Chairman of Strabane Council,
who is Sinn Fein, can appear in programmes to represent the Council. He can
speak about Council business, decisions made, problems faced, so long as he does
not proclaim Sinn Fein. It is accepted that such people are not always representing
their organisation even when speaking about their public duties. They cannot be
held to represent their organisation in all their daily activities. Some will be re-
garded as private. There will be difficult borderline cases to be decided case by
case depending on the context and the words spoken. Don't hesitate to consult.
BBC Guidelines, supra note 17, at 3. IBA Revised Guidelines, supra note 26, at 1-2.
34. The BBC interpreted the order, and clarification, in the following way:
[Olne of the main changes in this guidance note is that reported speech in
programmes is not now restricted. Programmes can quote Gerry Adams and peo-
ple like him whatever they say. They can be quoted verbatim or in paraphrase
regardless of whether their words support, invite support or urge support for an
organisation affected by the order. This means that our newsreaders, presenters,
correspondents, reporters and any other like editorial people in programmes can
freely be allowed to quote and refer to what the restricted organisations and their
people say (subject of course to normal legal restraints, like defamation). Com-
ments of support for any of the organisations from any source can be quoted.
This eased interpretation applies also to contributors such as political commenta-
tors from outside, MPs [Members of Parliament], academic experts, foreign
figures and others. While none of these can be allowed to speak words of support
of their own they can quote any of the organisations or any other source for pur-
poses of explanation and argument.
The central restriction applies in full force therefore only to the organisations and
people who made the supportive comments in the first place. As before, pictures
showing someone speaking but with the words given in voice-over are permitted.
BBC Guidelines, supra note 17, at 2. The IBA agreed. IBA Revised Guidelines, supra
note 26, at 1.
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any statement of support for any of the restricted organizations. The
identity of the speaker would not matter unless the statement fit within
one of the exceptions enumerated above. Thus, if President Bush chose
to denounce the Ban as having an undue impact on free speech, and as
repression of the restricted organizations, the statement could not be di-
rectly aired. The same would be true if an academic issued a similar
denunciation. The BBC and the IBA, however, did not interpret the Ban
this literally or broadly. The BBC and IBA ultimately interpreted the
Ban as applying only to statements explicitly supporting restricted
organizations.3"
Questions remained, however, about what would happen if a world
leader went further and actually did express some support for a re-
stricted organization's objectives. For example, suppose that a prominent
United States senator, in the context of a criticism of the Ban and its
impact on free speech, proclaimed that Sinn Fein had a legitimate cause
and objectives, and that it should be given direct access to radio and
television to express those views. An IBA official unhesitatingly stated
that the senator's statements could be directly aired." A BBC official
was not so sure.
3 7
Even after the clarification, the BBC and IBA interpreted the Ban as
extending to statements made in documentaries. The BBC would not
directly air a statement by a member of a restricted organization even as
part of a documentary on Northern Ireland. The Ban applied whether
or not the speaker was dead, and even though he may have been dead for
some time.38 Moreover, the BBC was concerned that the Ban might even
prevent it from directly airing a program showing a group singing Irish
protest songs. The BBC believed that direct access might be prohibited if
the songs were sung by demonstrators.39
35. Anonymous Interview, supra note 30; Glencross Interview, supra note 27.
36. Glencross Interview, supra note 27.
37. Anonymous Interview, supra note 30.
38. The BBC's position was that even "[1library material is covered. Comments
which offend the order do not have to have been recently made." BBC Guidelines, supra
note 17, at 4. See also IBA Revised Guidelines, supra note 26, at 2; Hurd Letter, supra
note 28.
39. The BBC interpreted the order to mean that "Irish rebel songs in genuine per-
formances will be all right. In certain circumstances though they could be restricted, for
instance, if sung by demonstrators." BBC Guidelines, supra note 17, at 4.
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III. LEGALITY OF THE BROADCASTING BAN
Under United States law, one could challenge the Ban as an unconsti-
tutional infringement of the rights of freedom of speech and of the press
under the first amendment.40 The British legal system functions much
differently than the United States system, however, and differences tran-
scend the mere presence or absence of judicial review. Under British
law, no constitutional challenges are possible; there is no writ-
ten constitution and no bill of rights." Thus, if the judiciary wants to
strike the Ban down, it will have to find some other basis.
Britain does have limited forms of review. British courts review ad-
ministrative action, as opposed to Parliamentary action, and can and do
declare such action invalid on occasion."2 But they do not do so on con-
stitutional grounds. Rather, they strike actions down as ultra vires.
43
The ultra vires doctrine states that a public authority, the Home Sec-
retary in the case of the Broadcasting Act, may not act outside the pow-
ers conferred on it by statute. This conclusion follows naturally from the
fundamental proposition of English law that administrative authority is
derived solely from statutes enacted by Parliament. If an administrative
agency acts in excess of the authority granted it by statute, the action is
invalid, that is, ultra vires.4 4
40. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
41. For an analysis of the British system, see Lee, Bicentennial Bork, Tercentennial
Spycatcher: Do the British Need a Bill of Rights?, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 777, 781-87
(1988). For discussion of the differences between the British and United States legal
systems, see P. ATIYAH & R. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAw (1987); see also Partlett, Book Review, 43 VAND. L. REV. - (forthcoming
May, 1990) (reviewing Atiyah & Summers).
42. See Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Comm'n [1969] 2 App. Cas. 147
(administrative tribunal's decision a nullity if it misunderstood the law and therefore
took account of wrong factors); Ridge v. Baldwin 1964 App. Cas. 40 (dismissal of chief
constable vitiated by failure to give a fair hearing); Short v. Poole Corp. 1926 Ch. 66;
Hall & Co. v. Shoreham-by-Sea Urban District Council [1964] 1 W.L.R. 240 (C.A.)
Chertsey Urban District Council v. Mixnam's Properties, Ltd. 1965 App. Cas. 735
(cases holding administrative action ultra vires on principle that Parliament cannot have
intended to authorize unreasonable action); Eckersley v. Secretary of State for the Envi-
ronment [1977] 34 P. & C.R. 124; Prest v. Secretary of State for Wales [1982] 81 L.J.R.
193 (C.A.) (agency's failure to take into account relevant considerations makes agency
action ultra vires).
43. See, e.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Department of Trade, 1977 Q.B. 643 (C.A.)
(holding that the Secretary of State for Trade had acted outside his authority in issuing a
direction to revoke a license to the Civil Aviation Authority). For a discussion of how the
ultra vires concept works under British law, see S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at 573-80.
44. The use of the ultra vires doctrine is the only means of judicial control over
agency action because judges have no constitution or bill of rights upon which to base
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Making an ultra vires argument for the Broadcasting Ban is difficult.
The Home Secretary has broad authority to control radio and television
networks. The 1981 Act governing broadcasting provides that "the Sec-
retary of State may at any time by notice in writing require the Author-
ity to refrain from broadcasting any matter or classes of matter specified
in the notice; and it shall be the duty of the Authority to comply with the
notice."'45 The broadcasters' licensing agreements contain similar provi-
sions. At the time of the Ban, the Home Office took the view that these
provisions gave the Minister broad authority to ban any broadcast. In a
newspaper interview, a Home Office spokesperson stated that the Act
does not limit its application "to times of crisis or national emergency. It
is quite casually worded in fact." '46
A court, however, could conceivably construe the Act more narrowly. 7
In R v. Home Secretary48 a challenge by a group of journalists to the
Broadcasting Ban, the counsel for the Home Office conceded that the
power conferred upon the Minister by the Broadcasting Act was not lim-
itless or unreviewable by the courts. Nevertheless, the Divisional Court
unanimously rejected the claim that the Home Secretary had acted un-
lawfully in the exercise of his powers. 9 Much of the argument in the
their decisions. As Wade explains, the judge "in every case ... must be able to demon-
strate that he is carrying out the will of Parliament as expressed in the statute conferring
the power." H.R.W. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 42 (6th ed. 1988).
A judge can declare an agency action ultra vires when the agency acts inconsistently
with the statute, either by failing to follow expressly prescribed procedures or by acting
outside its jurisdictional grant. Similarly, and somewhat more ingeniously, the courts can
declare an act ultra vires if it is unreasonable, takes into account irrelevant considera-
tions, fails to conform to the implicit policy of the parlimentary act, or fails to give a fair
hearing to anyone prejudicially affected. Id.
45. Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 29(3).
46. Independent (London), Oct. 21, 1988, at 2, col. 2.
47. Courts in recent years have shown a willingness to disregard the clear wording of
a statute in order to find the action ultra vires. See, e.g., Anisimic v. Foreign Compensa-
tion Comm'n, [1969] 2 App. Cas. 147. The relevant statute provided that "[tihe determi-
nation by the commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be
called into question in any court of law." Foreign Compensation Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6,
ch, 12 § 4(4). The court assumed jurisdiction over the Commission's determination on an
application, reviewed the decision, and struck it down as ultra vires.
48. Home Secretary, 139 NEw L.J.R. 1229 (Div. Ct.).
49. Id. See also 139 NEw L.J.R. 1751 (Ct. App.).
A decision whether or not to give directives under S 29(3) of the [1981] Act and
under cl. 13(4) of the [BBC] license and agreement and, if so, in what terms. .. is
a judgment to be made by the Home Secretary and not by the courts, whose right
and duty to interevene only arises in the event that the Home Secretary ... can be
shown to have taken account of matters which are relevant or in which the deci-
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case concerned the assertion that the Ban contravened article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights." Although the litigants might
not have expected to succeed with this argument, in the British courts,
they may have been laying the groundwork for a later application to the
European Court of Human Rights.
Although at the end of the day the British court decided in favor of the
Home Secretary, the case nevertheless supports the notion that in a suffi-
ciently strong case the courts could intervene. What is not so clear is the
threshold at which intervention would take place. Suppose the Home
Secretary purported to issue a ban on all broadcasting of party confer-
ences held by Britain's opposition parties. Or, to employ a less far-
fetched example, suppose he banned television broadcasts by the Labour
Party unless its leaders made statements condemning organizations such
as Sinn Fein. The latter, though distinguishable, is perhaps not so far
removed in principle from the present Ban. In both cases, affected par-
ties could test the legality of such orders by the ultra vires doctrine. 1
Judicial review of both Parliamentary and administrative action could
be available also under the European Convention on Human Rights of
1950. That Convention, to which Britain is a party, provides for free-
dom of expression,52 and Britain has agreed to be bound by European
sion is manifestly wrong as falling outside the wide spectrum of rational conclu-
sions ....
Id. at 1753.
50. The Divisional Court noted that it was proper to consider the provisions of arti-
cle 10 of the convention, 139 New L.J.R. 1229, 1230, but the Court of Appeals held that
"the Home Secretary ... is free to take account of the terms of the convention . . . he [is]
under no obligation to do so. It also follows that the terms of the convention are quite
irrelevant to our decision and that the Divisional Court erred in considering them ... 
139 New. L.J.R. at 1752.
51. A court could also limit the Act by requiring that the Home Secretary use his
power "reasonably." The reasonableness argument has well established roots in English
law. In Westminister Corp. v. L & N.W. Ry. 1905 App. Cas. 426, Lord McNaughten
said:
It is well-settled that a public body invested with statutory powers ... must take
care not to abuse its powers. It must keep within the limits of the authority com-
mitted to it. It must act in good faith. And it must act reasonably.
Id. at 430.
52. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. The relevant provi-
sion states that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include free-
dom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
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Court rulings under the Convention. 53 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that
the Ban can be successfully challenged on this basis. The Convention
contains gaping exceptions that significantly restrict its effectiveness."
Further, even if the European Court ruled adversely to the Government,
the ruling would have no immediate effect on English domestic law.55
The conventional view is that Parliament should implement the Euro-
pean Court decision by passing relevant legislation. 6 This may take
some time to effect, and the Government may even seek to derogate from
its obligations under the international treaty and decline to act. Such a
possibility has been canvassed in the context of police procedures in
Northern Ireland, which the European Court has held to be invalid.57
Moreover, even if the courts did strike down the Ban, Parliament
might be able to reimpose the Ban by its own act. The only possible
challenge then would be under the European Convention. Under Brit-
ain's internal law, Parliament can do as it wishes. It is supreme, 8 and is
enterprises.
Id. art. 10, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
53. S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at 112.
54. The exceptions:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibili-
ties, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disor-
der or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the repu-
tation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
European Convention, supra note 52, art. 10, para. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
55. A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC
LAW 178 (1983).
56. Id. The European Convention did not require implementing legislation. The
Government believed that domestic law complied with the convention. Id.
57. See, e.g., Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1986] 3
Common Mkt. L. Rep. 240 (Eng.); but see Bevan, supra note 13, at 61 ("The European
Court has already seen fit to correct one House of Lords decision on freedom of speech,
and that correction prompted the government to pass amending legislation to comply
with the Convention's obligations.").
58.
The Queen in Parliament is competent according to United Kingdom law, to
make or unmake any law whatsoever on any matter whatsoever; and no United
Kingdom court is competent to question the validity of an Act of Parliament.
Every other law-making body within the realm either derives its authority from
Parliament or exercises it at the sufferance of Parliament; it cannot be superior to
or even coordinate with, but must be subordinate to Parliament.
S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at 75, 81-84.
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not subject to the ultra vires doctrine.59  At most, the courts
would construe the Broadcasting Act restrictively to limit its impact.60
But Parliament could override the restrictive construction by passing a
new act,61 which the judiciary could not, of course, declare unconstitu-
tional. Parliament could also pass a new act broadening the Home Sec-
retary's authority and authorizing him to impose the Ban.
Parliament's supremacy over the courts stems from historical events
that give Parliament supremacy over every other part of Britain's Gov-
ernment. The long and often bitter rivalry between the Crown and Par-
liament, which reached its peak in the defeat of Charles I in the English
Civil War, has left Parliament firmly in control. References, for exam-
ple, to "Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition" as describing the opposition
party in Parliament, or to the Prime Minister as "Her Maj-
esty's Foremost Minister" have more form than substance. 2
Parliament's supremacy is so complete that there is little concept of
"checks" or "balances" against Parliament's authority. Moreover, very
little separation of powers-a fundamental component of a checks and
balances system-exists.6 3 At present, the Conservative Party holds ex-
ecutive power. But the Conservatives govern because they have majority
support in Parliament. The Prime Minister, Britain's equivalent of a
chief executive, 4 is and must be a member of Parliament. Moreover,
all cabinet members are also Members of Parliament. This blending of
power is not limited to the legislative and executive branches of the Gov-
59. See S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at 27.
60. The most notable example has been in the administrative area. Courts have been
quite resistant to Parliament's attempts to deprive them of the right to review adminis-
trative action. Courts repeatedly find ways to interpret their way around statutes pre-
cluding review. See S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at 600-05.
61. Of course, the new act may likewise be restrictively construed so as to nullify
Parliament's intent. See S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at 604-05. S.A. de Smith has
pointed out that one case, Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Comm'n, [19691 2
App. Cas. 147, "established the basic principle that if an authority or tribunal exceeds its
jurisdiction then its decision is regarded by the courts as invalid and beyond the protec-
tion of any exclusionary formula yet devised by Parliamentary draftsmen." S.A. DE
SMITH, supra note 5, at 606.
62. See S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at 132-33.
63. O.H. PHILLIPS & P. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
30 (7th ed. 1987) [hereinafter O.H. PHILLIPS]. See also S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at
30-34.
64. "The primary functions of the Prime Minister are to form a government, and to
choose and preside over the Cabinet. He gives advice to his ministerial colleagues on
matters before they come to the Cabinet, and he is the main channel of communication
between the Cabinet and the Sovereign, with whom he has a weekly audience." O.H.
PHILLIPS, supra note 63, at 317.
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ernment; it also extends to the judicial branch.15 The Lord Chancellor is
head of the judiciary but also serves as a member of the House of Lords
in his legislative capacity and is a member of the Cabinet. Indeed, he is a
judge because of his position as Lord Chancellor. The House of Lords,
in which resides the highest court in Britain, is part of Parlia-
ment.e6
The British are not completely insensitive, however, to the need for
separation of powers. The Lord Chancellor may be entitled to sit as a
judge, but he usually excuses himself in cases challenging governmental
action. Law Lords usually refrain from taking part in party politi-
cal debates in the House of Lords. If they speak, theyusually do so on
matters involving judicial or legal reform.6 8 Nevertheless, there remains
a high degree of blending between all three branches of government.
Even though Britain does not formally separate its three branches of
Government, nominal checks on Parliament's power, and on the Govern-
ment's power, do exist. When Parliament passes a bill (which was not
the case with the Ban), both the Queen and the House of Lords must
assent before the bill becomes law. The House of Lords can withhold
assent and even refer a matter back to the House of Commons for fur-
ther consideration. In practice, these checks are more formal than real.
For the Queen to refuse her assent would be unthinkable, 69 and if the
Commons ultimately insists on passage, the Lords are expected to
yield.7 0
The real checks on Parliamentary or governmental power in Britain
65. See O.H. PHILLIPS, supra note 63, at 29-31; S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at
30-34.
66. It is necessary for the House of Lords to be a part of Parliament in order to
provide some check on the power of the House of Commons. "As [Britain] has no written
constitution, if we had a unicameral legislature our governmental system and laws would
be at the mercy of a majority of one in the House of Commons, and moreover the House
of Commons could prolong its own life indefinitely." O.H. PHILLIPS, supra note 63, at
164.
67. See, e.g., supra note 51 (Lord McNaughton).
68. For a more thorough discussion the structure and operations of British govern-
ment, see S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5; O.H. PHILLIPS, supra note 63.
69. The last denial of Royal assent occurred in 1707, when Queen Anne refused to
assent to the Militia Bill. G. MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE RULES
AND FORMS OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 21-22 (1984). Constitutionally, the mon-
arch may not refuse to agree to any piece of legislation that has passed both Houses of
Parliament. M. ZANDER, A MATTER OF JUSTICE 260 (1988).
70. For a more thorough discussion of how the process works, see S.A. DE SMITH,
supra note 5, at 123-63, 316-20.
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are political. 1 Parliament may be supreme, and Conservatives may hold
a majority in Parliament, but the presence of opposition parties prevents
the Conservatives from merely doing as they wish. The Ban, even
though it was not enacted by Parliament, was fully debated in the
House of Commons. At that time, opposition parties had the chance to
state their concerns and objections.72 Moreover, Conservative Members
of Parliament concerned about the Ban could have spoken as well. Ob-
jections by members of the majority party are rare, however, because
Members of Parliament rarely advance in party ranks and rarely obtain
major ministerial posts if they are dissident.7 Yet, objections do occur.
If opposition parties fail to halt governmental action, the ultimate
check under the British system comes from public opinion . 4 Opposition
parties, in fact, have an interest in stirring up public opposition to mea-
sures with which they disagree. In doing so, they may be able to embar-
rass the Government. If public feeling against the Ban is strong enough,
the Government might be forced to revoke it. Moreover, Conservative
Members of Parliament might refuse to support their party. Ultimately,
the Government might fall through a vote of no confidence. Even if these
events did not transpire, the British people might retaliate against the
71. "The government's legislative proposals must stand up to debate, the debates will
be reported in the press or be available in Hansard, and the government must remember
that within a few years at most it will have to face another general election." O.H.
PHILLIPS, supra note 63, at 56.
72. Mr. Michael Foot, Member of Parliament, made the following argument:
Those who believe in the right to free speech and in the power of free debate to
solve problems will consider the measure an insult to the people of the United
Kingdom, as well as to the people of Northern Ireland, because it means that they
cannot judge for themselves about the programmes that they see. If argument con-
tinues and the possibility of putting a case remains, we have the strongest benefit
and safeguard for the country.
139 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 1097 (1988). Mr. Roy Hattersley, the shadow Home
Secretary, argued that:
I do not doubt for a moment that the sight of a supporter of the IRA justifying a
bomb outrage is offensive to most British people. It is offensive to me. The bogus
apologies and hypocritical statements of regret are more offensive still. But the
question we must answer is not whether that causes offence-undoubtedly it
does-but whether in a free society causing gross and justifiable offence is suffi-
cient reason for limiting the broadcasters' right to broadcast.
Id. at 1084.
73. See S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at 271. The system of parliamentary sover-
eignty has been dubbed an "elective dictatorship" by some critics, since power is concen-
trated in the hands of a small group of powerful, albeit elected, officials. See Q.H. HAIL-
SHAM, THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY 125 (1978), Lee, supra note 41, at 783-84.
74. See O.H. PHILLIPS, supra note 63, at 56.
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Government at the next election, driving the majority party from
power.75
IV. TRADEOFFS
Does the British system function well? Does it adequately limit gov-
ernmental abuse and protect fundamental liberties? It is interesting to
contemplate what would have happened if the President or Congress had
imposed a similar ban in the United States. The judiciary has not de-
cided a comparable case. However, it is likely that the Ban would have
been struck down as an impermissible restraint on freedom of speech and
freedom of the press under the first amendment. 6
The fact that the Ban would have been struck down in the United
States does not, by itself, suggest much about the impact of a judicial
review system. It is quite possible that, even if Britain had a system
identical to the United States system, including a written constitution
75. "British people must, in the end, carry the responsibility for the policy their
government pursues: they pay the piper and could, if they wished, call an end to the
tune." L. CURTIS, IRELAND: THE PROPAGANDA WAR, THE BRITISH MEDIA AND THE
BATTLE FOR HEARTS AND MINDS 278 (1984). Of course, by means of the Broadcasting
Ban, the British Government is trying to prevent the public from being fully aware of
just what tune the piper is playing. See id. at 1.
76. The Ban suffers from numerous constitutional defects. For example, it is argua-
bly overbroad. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 1022-39 (on the overbreadth doctrine in
constitutional interpretation). Even if the Ban could be supported on the basis that
Northern Ireland is beset by terrorism and the Ban is needed to help suppress the terror-
ism, the Ban goes too far because it is not limited to speech by terrorists. It extends even
to statements by legal political parties and by elected officials whether or not they are
speaking about terrorism or terrorist incidents. It also extends to statements made by
world leaders, academics, and otliers. See supra notes 23-26. The Ban is also vague. See
L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 684 (on vagueness and due process). The media has had great
difficulty determining its meaning and application. See supra notes 27-39 and accompa-
nying text. Indeed, in the House of Commons debate on the Ban, Mr. Foot, Member of
Parliament, pointed out how much difficulty the broadcasters were having trying to fig-
ure out what the orders meant:
As my right hon. Friend the Member for Sparbrook has explained, there is al-
ready complete confusion in the BBC and IBA, as well as elsewhere, about what
can and cannot be reported. If they ask how to resolve the confusion, the absurd
answer is that they must apply to the government.
139 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 1096 (1988). In the United States, therefore, the Ban
would probably be invalid. See NAACP v. Sutton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Moreover, it is
doubtful whether the Ban's means or ends are legitimate or sufficiently compelling. The
speech being suppressed is political speech, which in the United States is subject to the
highest level of judicial scrutiny. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978). As noted above, the justifications given for the suppression are inadequate, and
thus the need for the restriction is not sufficiently compelling.
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and separation of powers, it might uphold the Ban. A constitution, like
any written document, must be interpreted." Even if they had to apply
a first amendment, British courts might interpret it differently
than United States courts. That would not be surprising, as United
States judges differ among themselves about how the Constitution, in-
cluding the first amendment, ought to be interpreted-
It would be difficult to argue, however, that judicial review does not at
least partially influence the United States position on the interview Ban.
Britain leaves many issues regarding individual freedoms to the political
process. The European Convention does provide some restraint,1 8 but,
assuming that government action can fit within one of the Convention's
exceptions, as it probably can in the case of the Broadcasting Ban, that
restraint disappears.79 Parliament can then restrict any freedom, includ-
ing freedom of speech or of the press, without judicial intervention. It is
quite possible that many rights suffer at the hands of political expedi-
ency. Confronted by a difficult problem, such as terrorism in Northern
Ireland, politicians may believe that one solution is to restrict civil liber-
ties. Even if the politicians generally agree that freedom of speech and of
the press are important freedoms, they might view the benefits of those
rights as relatively amorphous compared to the concrete danger
presented by terrorism."0
In the United States, judicial review has served as a check on the po-
litical process. The checking function, however, cannot be attributed
merely to the existence of judicial review. Judicial review is effective
because a written constitution provides express protection for free speech
and a free press and provides that the judiciary is not regarded as
subordinate to either Congress or the President. Each branch of govern-
ment is regarded as separate and equal.8" Congress does have primary
77. In the ongoing debate in Britain over whether that country should adopt a writ-
ten bill of rights, opponents emphasize precisely this fact. Both the Conservative and
Labour parties are reluctant to enact a bill of rights, because the British judiciary would
then have the power to interpret the Constitution. Political parties now wield the power
of interpretation, by virtue of Parliament's supremacy and its political nature, and the
parties are unwilling to part with this power. See Lee, supra note 41, at 784-87.
78. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
80. The fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has
recently eroded, evidently to facilitate the "war on drugs." See United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984) (evidence seized under a defective search warrant is admissible if police
relied in good faith on the warrant's validity); LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expedi-
ency," Its Rationales and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 895.
81. See L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 18-400.
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lawmaking authority, and the courts are expected to respect that author-
ity, but no branch of government is above the Constitution. If Congress
passes a law that conflicts with the Constitution, the judiciary is expected
to give effect to the Constitution rather than the law.82 Moreover, the
judiciary has reserved to itself final authority to say what the Constitu-
tion means, and to decide whether a law conflicts with it.83
The judiciary's independence is rooted in the Constitution itself, which
grants federal judges life tenure and guarantees against diminution in
salary.84 The resulting situation allows and encourages United States
judges to take a more independent and detached view than either the
President or Congress. Moreover, judges are not enmeshed in the day-to-
day problems of government. Their duty is to give effect to the Constitu-
tion's language and values, and to decide whether the Government's ac-
tion unduly impinges upon those values. From this vantage point, the
judiciary might disagree with the Government's conclusion that some
governmental action, like the imposition of an interview ban, was neces-
sary and that it does not unduly impinge constitutional limitations. In
the United States the judiciary has disagreed with and overturned a poli-
tician's assessment of a situation on many occasions.8 5
Courts cannot entirely divorce themselves from political realities. In-
deed, as one analyzes United States constitutional decisions, it is clear
that judges take those realities into account. Few constitutional rights
are absolute; most rights can be abridged by a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest. Thus, in order to decide whether the political
branches have acted properly, the judiciary must weigh the need for the
restriction against the degree of burden it imposes.8 6 United States courts
deciding constitutional cases frequently engage in such analysis. But
judges, perhaps because of their more neutral and detached position, fre-
quently reach different results than politicians as they weigh the compet-
ing interests.8 7
A judicial review system, like that existing in the United States, will
not always succeed in limiting governmental abuse. It is easy to argue
that instances have occurred in which the United States judicial review
82. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).
83. Id. at 177.
84. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
85. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
86. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
87. See supra note 86.
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system has failed to check constitutional violations."8 The reason for
these perceived failures is obvious. A constitution, like any written in-
strument, can suffer from vagueness or ambiguity.8 9 This is particularly
true of the United States Bill of Rights. Most of its provisions are
framed in the most general of terms,90 and so must be interpreted.
88. The authors repeatedly heard comments from British academics expressing con-
cern about the decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). They might ques-
tion how a system that purports to protect individual freedoms could allow prosecution
for homosexual conduct between consenting adults in a private bedroom. They also can-
not understand how the United States Supreme Court could refuse to extend the right of
privacy to this situation. United States academics point to early freedom of speech deci-
sions that were similarly restrictive as evidence that the United States may eventually
reform its position on homosexuality and privacy. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding a conviction for publications that advocated strikes in ammu-
nition factories during the First World War).
89. This is true of any written document. Justice Frankfurter made this point in an
incisive article on statutory interpretation:
Anything that is written may present a problem of meaning, and that is the es-
sence of the business of judges in construing legislation. The problem derives from
the very nature of words. They are symbols of meaning. But unlike mathematical
symbols, the phrasing of a document, especially a complicated enactment, seldom
attains more than approximate precision. If individual words are inexact symbols,
with shifting variables, their configuration can hardly achieve invariant meaning
or assured definiteness.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528
(1947). See also Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes, 1 U.
TORONTO L.J. 286, 301 (1936).
90. The fifth amendment guarantees citizens the right to due process of law. But
there is no precise standard by which to judge whether some particular procedure or
protection is required. For example, does the fifth amendment require a "hearing" for a
legislative determination? Does it require a hearing for an adjudicative determination? If
so, what kind? Must an agency provide someone with a full trial hearing, or may it
provide only a limited hearing? These questions have vexed the courts. See, e.g., Board of
Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441
(1915).
The first amendment provision on free speech is equally imprecise. Although the
amendment is phrased in absolute terms ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech . . . ." U.S. CONST., amend. I), the Supreme Court has held that it is
not absolute. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961). Freedom of
speech may be overcome by a sufficiently compelling governmental interest. Id. The first
amendment does not, however, indicate how important the governmental interests must
be or how -the right to free speech will be weighed against such interests. The courts
must resolve these issues themselves relying only on general principles such as the pur-
poses and policies underlying the first amendment. Of course, there is disagreement over
how to define the purposes and policies. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 670-71,
1164-66, 1307-08, 1478 (evidencing interpretations of the Constitution); J.H. ELY, DE-
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Judges can disagree about what the Constitution means, and how it
should be interpreted. 1 That is precisely why such controversy has
arisen in recent years over nominations to the United States Supreme
Court.9 2 Many correctly perceive that judicial results are heavily affected
by who is doing the judging and who has done the appointing9" and
question how much protection the Constitution really provides.
Despite these flaws, and despite perceived failures, the United States
judicial review system has limited the power of government and has pro-
tected individual rights in many instances.94 Moreover, even if the courts
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); A. BICKEL, supra note 2.
The general nature of most constitutional provisions, and the need for interpretation,
is amply revealed in the way United States professors teach courses in constitutional law
and criminal procedure. Students do not spend long hours poring over the Constitution
and contemplating the intricacies of its language and structure. Instead, they purchase
massive casebooks filled with judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution. In many
instances, students contemplate questions that have evolved so far away from the Consti-
tution's language that the language seems almost superfluous.
91. The United States Supreme Court has, for example, completely reversed its in-
terpretation of: the tenth amendment-compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976) with Garcia v. San Antonio Metro, Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985);
the commerce clause-compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) with
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); and the fourth amend-
ment-compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). Moreover, sometimes the Court is more protective of rights than at other times.
Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 with United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
92. The nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court
stirred the most controversy. Bork publicly indicated his disagreement with the holding
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Supporters of that decision feared that he would
help overturn it if he were confirmed.
President Nixon's appointments to the United States Supreme Court also demon-
strated that who is judging has an important impact on the Constitution's meaning. Dur-
ing the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court was oriented toward expanding civil rights.
It was quite concerned about protecting the rights of defendants and suspects in the
criminal justice process. President Nixon, concerned about the perceived "liberal bent" of
the Court appointed justices whom he believed would be more conservative on so-called
"law and order" issues. Lamb, Judicial Restraint on the Supreme Court, in SUPREME
COURT AcTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 7 (S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds. 1982) [hereinafter
ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT]. Cf. Graglia, In Defense of Judicial Restraint in Supreme
Court Activism and Restraint in ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT, supra, at 182-83. In sub-
sequent years, the Supreme Court moved to restrict many of the earlier criminal
decisions.
93. See L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE OF
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HIsToRY (1985); see also Lee, supra note 41,
at 794.
94. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 2, at 785-1435 (covering rights of communi-
cation, expression, political participation, privacy, and personhood).
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have failed to vindicate individual rights in a given case, as some might
argue, United States citizens are no worse off than British citizens are
under their system. When a failure occurs in the United States and gov-
ernment is allowed to assume power it should not have, the political
process check remains. In Britain, by contrast, there are few limits ex-
cept the political process.
Even if one could conclude that systemic differences produce the dif-
fering positions of the United States and Britain on the Broadcasting
Ban, that fact alone does not demonstrate that judicial review is either
necessary or desirable. If one's objective is to give citizens greater indi-
vidual rights and to place restrictions on governmental power, then the
United States system seems preferable. But are there tradeoffs? Does
Britain derive any compensating benefits from its system?
In the United States, the judicial review system can function in a very
undemocratic manner. 5 Unelected judges invalidate actions by demo-
cratically-elected officials, sometimes in the face of public opposition. In
Britain, judges would not take such a step vis-a-vis Parliament. They
would allow that democratically-elected institution to impose its will.9"
They might strike down an order by the Home Secretary, but only if he
exceeded his delegated authority. But is the more limited role of the Brit-
ish courts necessarily bad? Even if British citizens receive fewer rights
under their system, cannot that result be justified as simply a permissible
trade-off that occurs in allowing the democratic process to function?97
One interesting aspect of the Ban is that it produced little public reac-
tion.98 On the day the Ban was announced, opposition party members
expressed concern about the wisdom of the action and about the way it
would affect fundamental liberties.99 British journalists were particularly
95. See L. HAND, supra note 4, at 11-18; Wechsler, supra note 3, at 3-5.
96. See S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at 73-104.
97. But cf. J.H. ELY, supra note 90 (Legal process theorists argue that certain rights
are necessary to allow democracy to function.).
98. Int'l Herald Tribune, Nov. 13, 1988, at 5 ("Proposals by the government to limit
freedom of the press and restrict the right of criminal defendants' to remain silent have
brought little public outcry in Britain, although the government may yet face
opposition.").
99. The Times reported much criticism the day after the Ban was announced:
Mr Roy Hattersley, the shadow Home Secretary, warned MPs that the move
would have an [sic] damaging effect at home and abroad, particularly in the
United States, and had handed a propaganda coup to the IRA.
Mr Paddy Ashdown, the leader of the Democrats and his party's spokesman on
Northern Ireland, condemned Mr Hurd's decision as "ill-conceived, ill-judged and
counter-productive."
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upset.' 0 ° BBC employees contemplated a one-day strike.'' But the level
of media and newspaper criticism abated fairly quickly. Our discussions
with British citizens, admittedly an unscientific poll, produced some in-
teresting reactions. University lecturers, particularly those knowledgea-
ble about the United States system, were upset by the Ban, as were me-
dia personnel, but average citizens were apathetic, or even supportive of
the Ban. Many thought that the restrictions were sensible and necessary
in light of the situation in Northern Ireland. If the British Government
and the British people do not find the Ban objectionable, then is it an
unreasonable or undue restriction on fundamental liberties?.. 2 Some ad-
ditional controversy erupted when the Ban was debated in the House of
Commons,103 but the pressure was not great enough to force the Govern-
ment to revoke the Ban.
Times (London), Oct. 20, 1988, at 24, cols. 3-4.
100. The Ban was heavily criticized in both the press and media. The Times reported
that:
[B]roadcasters were united in their disapproval of the ban, but said that they
would abide by the Government's decision. Mr Marmaduke Hussey, chairman of
the BBC, and Mr Michael Checkland, the corporation's director-general, said it
set a "damaging precedent." Mr David Nicholas, editor and chief executive of
Independent Television News, said the distinction between broadcasters and news-
papers was not justified.
The most scathing criticism came from the National Union of Journalists,
which said British broadcasters were now operating under much the same condi-
tions that applied in South Africa. Opposition MPs also condemned the move,
saying it provided Sinn Fein and its military wing, the IRA, with a "propaganda
coup."
Mr Hussey and Mr Checkland said the BBC had always operated under strin-
gent guidelines when interviewing representatives of organizations linked to
terrorism.
"This new instruction sets a damaging precedent and will make our reporting of
Northern Ireland affairs incomplete," they said ....
ITN said in a statement: "It has always been ITN policy to observe the law.
We have always regarded it as our prime obligation to report the range of opin-
ions allowed under a parliamentary democracy."
"The Government still accords legal status to Sinn Fein and the UDA. These
restrictions would have been easier to understand if they had been made illegal.
Public opinion is more resolute than ever in its determination to defeat terrorism.
This owes a lot to the full and free reporting of Northern Ireland, which has
exposed terrorism for what it is."
Id. at 1, cols. 2, 3. Id. at 2, col. 3.
101. Times (London), Nov. 3, 1988, at 1, cols. 2, 3.
102. But see infra note 118 and accompanying text.
103. 139 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 1075-77 (1988).
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V. MINORITY RIGHTS
One must, of course, question whether Britain adequately protects mi-
norities. One of the most often asserted justifications for judical review is
that it is needed to protect minorities against oppression.0 The concern
is that the majority, if allowed to have its way, will tend to oppress
minority groups. In the United States the courts have protected minori-
ties in many instances.' 5
This justification for judicial review makes a troubling statement
about United States attitudes towards the democratic process. In Britain,
the democractic process is supposed to provide the ultimate check on gov-
ernmental abuse. In the United States, the courts are supposed to check
that process.
Is judicial review really needed to protect minorities? In Britain, Par-
liament has shown some sensitivity to the needs of minorities. Britain has
anti-discrimination laws relating to housing,106 employment,1 0 7 educa-
tion, ' 8 access to goods and services,10 9 clubs," 0 advertising,"' x and chari-
ties." 2 Britain also has laws against incitement to racial hatred.113
104. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton); 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 103 (Henry Reeve text, P. Bradley ed. 1945) ("[T]he power vested in the
American courts of justice of pronouncing a statute to be unconstitutional forms one of
the most powerful barriers that have ever been devised against the tyranny of political
assemblies."); J.H. ELY, supra note 90 (Advancing the legal process theory of judicial
review based on ensuring that minorities are included in the political process); M.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). The central
concern of United States courts' strict scrutiny analysis in fourteenth amendment equal
protection cases is to root out governmental action tainted by "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities . . . which tends . . . to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities" in our society. United States
v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (Stone, J., concurring).
105. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (overturning a state law prohib-
iting interracial marriages); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding
that racial discrimination in public education violates the equal protection clause); Shel-
ley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)(prohibiting the use of restrictive covenants among
property owners to exclude persons of designated races).
106. Race Relations Act 1976, ch. 74, § 21.
107. Id. §§ 4-9.
108. Id. §§ 17-19.
109. Id. § 20.
110. Id. § 25.
111. Id. § 29.
112. Id. § 34.
113. Id.; Public Order Act 1936, 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, ch. 6, § 5A. Of course, laws
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Moreover, Britain's channel four has a special obligation to cater to in-
terests not targeted by other channels."14
However, many question whether these acts have resulted in tangible
gains for the minorities they were intended to benefit.115 They assert that
enforcement mechanisms"' are inadequate, and that there have been re-
strictive judicial interpretations. Non-whites have had difficulty rectify-
ing these problems, as they accounted for only 4.4 percent of Britain's
population in 1985.7 Thus, in Britain, minorities must rely on the be-
nevolence of other groups within the democratic process to provide the
ultimate check on governmental abuse.
Significant differences do exist between the United States and Britain
with respect to the protection of minorities. But it is difficult to argue
that the British system is necessarily worse. They provide fewer protec-
tions to minorities, but they do so to promote a competing
value-allowing the democractic process to function. Can the differences
between the United States and British systems be justified as within per-
such as these tend to restrict other liberties. See Lasson, Racism in Great Britain: Draw-
ing the Line on Free Speech, 7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161 (1987).
114. The Broadcasting Act 1981, ch. 68, § 11 provides that the IBA is required to
ensure that Channel Four's programs "contain a suitable proportion of matter calculated
to appeal to tastes and interests not generally catered for by ITV." Id.; Broadcasting
White Paper, supra note 20, at 11, 12, 24. The government views Channel Four as a
success. Id. at 24-26.
115. As early as 1971, critics of the Race Relations Act of 1968, focusing on the
Act's weak enforcement provisions, noted that the British government had learned little
from its North American counterparts about drafting effective legislation against discrim-
ination. Kushnick, British Anti-Discrimination Legislation, in THE PREVENTION OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN BRITAIN 233, 264-68 (S. Abbot ed. 1971). Similar frustra-
tions have been voiced about the 1976 Act; patterns of discrimination found in 1985 were
much like those of 1974, and private employers have done little to eliminate direct or
indirect discrimination. See Ohri & Faruqi, Racism, Employment, and Unemployment,
in BRITAIN'S BLACK POPULATION 61, 82-87, 91 (A. Bhot, R. Carr-Hill & S. Ohri 2d
ed. 1988). Broadcasting White Paper, supra note 20, at 24-26. For a discussion of the
protection of civil rights in Britain, see Abernathy, Should the United Kingdom Adopt a
Bill of Rights?, 31 AM. J. CoMP. L. 431 (1983).
Other parliamentary systems are not necessarily as protective of individual liberties as
Great Britain. See J. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL OR-
DER 35 (1978). If public opinion is the ultimate check on governmental abuse, it is per-
haps interesting to note the difficulties experienced by the British media detailed in this
Essay. The media has unparalleled power to shape public opinion, yet, as noted above,
the average citizen cares little about the Ban. If a powerful entity such as the media
cannot generate sympathy for its concerns, imagine the problems faced by insular and
perhaps unpopular minorities.
116. See Kushnick, supra note 115.
117. D. MURPHY, TALES FROM Two CITIE 2 (1987).
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missible bounds in the functioning of a democratic society?
VI. CONCERNS ABOUT THE BRITISH SYSTEM: THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF POLITICAL CHECKS
In theory, public opinion can provide an important check on govern-
mental abuse.11 8 The reality may be something different. In the ab-
sence of a written constitution and judicial review, the British Govern-
ment retains a good deal of power over the British media and press.11
The extent to which the Government uses this power is unknown, but
the mere existence of the power is troubling. To what extent does the
Government use its power to limit the effectiveness of the press and me-
dia, to blunt their criticisms, and to shape public opinion? To what ex-
tent does this undermine the effectiveness of Britain's political checks?
A. The Broadcasting Ban
The Broadcasting Ban provides a good example of governmental me-
dia control. The Government prohibited the media from giving certain
speakers direct access, offering two justifications. First, it argued that
media interviews give an appearance of authority to the speaker, and
that members and supporters of restricted organizations have used this
status to heighten the fear associated with terrorism. 2 This justification
can hardly sustain the Ban. Many of the restricted organizations are
legal organizations, and some of their members are democratically
elected officials. These officials might speak out on many issues that have
nothing to do with terrorism, and with no intent to frighten the popula-
tion. They may, for example, want to voice an opinion on some local
issue (such as whether a hospital ought to be closed), or on some politi-
cal matter (such as the Northern Ireland problem generally) without en-
couraging or promoting terrorism. Moreover, why should these officials,
118. See, e.g., M. CAPPELLITTI, JUDICIAL REvIEw IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD § 1 (1971) ("[fin a given country political facts may provide a better check than
the courts on attempts to establish majoritarian tyranny."). See also supra notes 73-77
and accompanying text.
119. See Wallach, Executive Powers of Prior Restraint Over Publication of Na-
tional Security Information: The U.K. and U.S. Compared, 32 I.C.L.Q. 424, 451 (1983)
("The British Government has and exercises prior restraint powers against the press
with no meaningful limitations... [T]hrough pressures, threats, and prosecutions which,
taken as a whole, can only reveal a coherent Government policy for over sixty years,
there has been in Britain Government censorship on defence matters and a great deal
more.").
120. 139 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 1082 (1988) (statement of Home Secretary
Douglas Hurd).
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or any speaker for that matter, not have the status of the media behind
them when they speak out on an issue? Why should the media not be
able to use direct statements as part of documentaries on the Northern
Ireland problem?
The inadequacy of the offered justification is troubling. A cynic might
argue that the Government was not as worried about frightening state-
ments as it was about controlling public opinion on the North-
ern Ireland issue.' 2' After the Ban, the Government's views continued to
receive full coverage by the media, but members or supporters of re-
stricted groups will be covered in a more limited way. If the Govern-
ment is correct in concluding that those who have direct access are ac-
corded more respect and authority, then the Government has created for
itself an advantage in its efforts to influence public opinion.
1 22
The second justification offered by the Government was that members
of restricted groups sometimes made offensive statements.' 23 In one in-
stance, a member of Sinn Fein appeared on television after a bombing
incident. He stated that the victims "had it coming" and that the cause of
Sinn Fein was just. But were these statements really in bad taste and
offensive, or were they part of legitimate public debate? Moreover, who
should resolve that issue? If the statements had been truly offensive, the
media could have declined to show them. Furthermore, the statements if
shown should have had an adverse effect on public opinion. On the other
hand, if the public did not view the statements as offensive, but rather as
legitimate political debate, then what was the Government trying to ac-
complish by banning them? Might it have been trying to manipulate
public opinion by squelching dissent? The second justification would, in
any event, fail to sustain such a far-reaching Ban. The Government
could simply have prohibited the airing of "offensive" statements and
121. Secretary Hurd has implicitly agreed with this statement, noting that
"[t]errorists themselves draw support and sustenance from having access to radio and
television, and from addressing their views more directly to the population than is possi-
ble through the press." Michael, Attacking the Easy Platform, 138 NEW L.J. 786
(1988). Mr. Hurd also declared that the Ban was designed to "deny this easy platform to
those who use it to propagate terrorism." Id.
122. In addition to the Government's influence being greater because it has limited
other sources of information, the voice of government, generally perceived as speaking for
the populace, is a powerful means of shaping public opinion. Welch, The State as a
Purveyor of Morality, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 540 (1988); M. YUDOF, WHEN Gov-
ERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITIcs, LAW AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 193
(1983).
123. Broadcasting White Paper, supra note 20, at 36.
[VCol. 22:1119
NORTHERN IRELAND BROADCASTING BAN
given some guidance as to what was deemed offensive. 24
Whether this second justification was the real reason for the Ban is
questionable. Both the BBC and IBA decided, after the Home Office's
letter of clarification, that broadcasting statements about terrorist inci-
dents was permissible. 2 5 They could be broadcast verbatim provided
they were read by someone other than the speaker, or they could be
paraphrased. Broadcasters were prohibited only from allowing "direct
access" or allowing a person to be shown or heard making his own state-
ment. If the allegedly offensive statements could still be aired, then does
it matter how the message is transmitted? The offensive statements still
get onto the air. Perhaps statements are somewhat less offensive if the
actual person making the statement is not heard.'2 6
The Government might argue that the Ban's impact is mitigated by
the fact that individuals are given indirect access to television and ra-
dio. "'27 But, if indirect access is equivalent to direct access, why was the
Ban necessary? The Government's own statements have acknowledged
that the right to direct access is important.'28
124. For example, the United States Government has the right to prohibit certain
types of obscenity. On the other hand, providing guidance as to what constitutes obscen-
ity can be difficult. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)(setting out Constitu-
tional guidelines for obscenity statutes). On offensiveness, see Brockett v. Spokane Ar-
cades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491 (1985) (offensiveness must be assessed under the standards of
the community). Certain bans on speech deemed offensive, however, have been struck
down by the United States courts. See American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985).
125. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
126. The Home Secretary made this point in the House of Commons debate:
When there is a terrorist attack and television screens carry to mourning people
pictures of tears and bloodshed, it is hard for us on this side of the water to under-
stand the outrage that is felt when, soon afterwards, there can appear on the same
screens, particularly in Northern Ireland, people who, just keeping on the right
side of the law, justify and glory in what has been done and threaten more of it.
That is the difference between direct access and the report. It is not suprising that
a member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, a member of the UDR, or any law-
abiding citizen of the Province finds it hard to understand how we can be wholly
serious in our efforts against terrorism if that kind of triumphalism is acceptable.
139 PARL. DEB. H.C. (6th ser.) 1081-82 (1988).
127. Home Secretary Douglas Hurd made exactly this point when the Ban was de-
bated in the House of Commons:
Opposition Members continue to claim that this is a major incursion upon the
right of freedom of expression. As I have made clear tonight, that cannot be so
because broadcasters remain free to report the activities of those organizations and
the actual words used by their representatives.
Id. at 1079, col. 1.
128. See supra note 22.
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The Ban did not affect the print media.12 Television and radio, how-
ever, probably have a far greater impact on public opinion than the print
media because more people watch television and listen to radio than read
the newspaper. In addition, television and radio can have a far greater
impact because they allow the viewer or listener actually to see or hear
the speaker. Indeed, that was the Government's concern.
B. Other Media Controls
The Broadcasting Ban might be less troubling if it were an isolated
incident, but strong evidence exists that the Government has manipu-
lated the media before. 30 Given the limited effectiveness of judicial
checks, the Government has many opportunities to do so.
The BBC, which includes both television and radio broadcasting, is in
theory independent. It has an independent Board of Governors, but the
Government advises the Queen on, and therefore effectively controls,
who should be appointed as BBC Governors. It also sets the BBC's li-
cense fee, from which the BBC derives its revenue. The IBA is similarly
situated. It operates under statutory authority, and the Government ap-
points its members. 3 '
Governmental control of the media is possible also because Britain
does not have a large media. At present, only four television stations
exist, and these four stations operate under a duopoly. The BBC controls
channels one and two, and the IBA controls channels three and four.'32
Because of this duopoly, the Government can exercise much greater in-
fluence over the media than would be possible in the United States.
Under the Broadcasting Act, it can do so directly, as it did in the case of
the Ban. Moreover, the Broadcasting Act permits the Government to
compel broadcasters to refrain from airing material, 33 as well as to com-
pel them to air matter the Government wishes to have aired.' The
Government can enforce its orders in several ways. The ultimate sanc-
tion for failure to comply with a valid direction is revocation of the li-
cense to broadcast. 3 " In addition, the Government has a less drastic,
129. The orders were directed at the BBC and IBA. See supra note 16 (quoting a
copy of the order). The government has no authority to regulate the press. Of course,
Parliament could give it that authority.
130. See infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
131. Broadcasting Act 1981, ch. 68, § 1.
132. See supra note 16. On proposed changes, see infra note 157.
133. Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 29(3).
134. Id. § 29(1).
135. See id. § 3(7); Telecommunications Act, 1984, ch. 12, § 7(2).
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though still very potent remedy-it may ask the Crown to dismiss the
BBC's Governors,13 6 or it may dismiss the IBA's board members
itself.'" 7
The Government also exercises more subtle influence. The best exam-
ple involves BBC coverage of Northern Ireland. Commentators state that
the BBC has a "reference up" system whereby reporting on political
violence must receive clearance at the highest level. x3s Some have as-
serted that Government pressures have resulted in editorial policies that
do not even attempt to maintain impartiality. Reporting is expected to
show "sympathy" for the official spokesman,'39 resulting in "stunted"
broadcast coverage.' 40 The BBC, however, denies the existence of any
such system.''
At times the Government engages in outright intimidation. In 1985
the BBC was planning to air, in a series called "Real Lives," a program
entitled "At The Edge of The Union." The program would show how
two political activists of extreme and opposing views, one Catholic and
one Protestant, justified their positions and how they and their families
conducted their lives. The Prime Minister and the Home Secretary de-
nounced the planned airing and pressured the BBC into temporarily
withdrawing it.'" 2
Britain also exercises some control over the press. A so-called "D"
Notice system exists'43 under which government departments advise
broadcasters and newspapers on matters that might affect national secur-
ity. Technically, the system is non-statutory and voluntary, although dis-
closure of the information may lead to a breach of the Official Secret
136. See S.A. DE SMITH, supra note 5, at 486.
137. Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, sched. 1. Experience in the Irish Republic sug-
gests that such a course is not unthinkable. In November 1972 the Government dismissed
en bloc the board of RTE, the equivalent of the Board of Governors of the BBC, for
refusal to comply with a ministerial direction. See S.A. de Smith, supra note 5, at 486.
138. See G. HOGAN & C. WALKER, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN
NORTHERN IRELAND 158 (1989).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. The Britsh government also undertook a great deal of censorship during the
Second World War. See id. at 157. See also Taylor, Censorship in Britain in the Second
World War: An Overview, reprinted in A.C. DUKE & C.A. TAmSE, ToO MIGHTY TO
BE FREE (1987).
142. See C. WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW, Xi
(1986).
143. For a description of how the "D" Notice System operates, see Wallach, supra
note 119, at 445-59.
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Acts""' in an appropriate case. 45 More subtly, even if no offense occurs,
an editor who defies the system may find that confidential information
formerly supplied to him by official sources ceases to become
available. 4
Some people, including those in high places, might not view Govern-
ment manipulation of the media as necessarily bad. There are those who
believe that the press and media have an obligation to support Govern-
ment policies. Lord Annan, Chairman of the Committee on the Future
of Broadcasting, has argued that the media owes an obligation to the
state. 47 He believes that when the press reports on issues concerning the
state, such as Northern Ireland, the Falklands War, or the security ser-
vices, it should support the state. He criticizes those who disagree by
questioning whether they "ever thought about what the first initial of
the BBC stands for .. . ."'" It must be emphasized that Lord Annan's
views are not universally shared. Others have soundly criticized them, 49
144. Official Secrets Act 1911 to 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch. 121, § 2. See, e.g., Official
Secrets Act 1920, 10 & 11, Geo. 5, ch. 75, § 3 (interfering with officers of the police).
145. Wallach, supra note 119, at 448 & n.241, 250.
146. Id. at 449.
147. Annan, The BBC: Its Duty to the State, Sunday Telegraph (London), Nov. 20,
1988, at 25, cols. 1, 2.
148. Id. at col. 2.
149. Christopher Dunkley, a journalist, penned the following rebuke to Lord Annan:
This [Lord Annan's argument], surely, is profoundly and dangerously wrong. Not
only can the BBC remain impartial under such circumstances (meaning editorially
impartial, and not implying that individual journalists should feel no sorrow or
pain at the loss of their countrymen) but it was just such impartiality which
gained the BBC its worldwide reputation for honesty and dependability during
World War II. Throughout that war the BBC studiously eschewed "our troops,"
and "our ships," and behaved, as far as humanly possible, like a neutral onlooker.
It is precisely those times when "Monarchy, Parliament, Judiciary, Ministries"
are most unanimously in agreement on some urgent matter of national pol-
icy-opposing a national strike, sending troops into Suez, preparing a South At-
lantic task force-that the citizen of a free country is most in need of the journalist
who stands aside from the herd, turns his ear from the chorus, and offers a report
which is, as nearly as possible, wholly impartial. If the stance necessary to achieve
that looks "arrogant," so be it.
As for the rhetoric over the first initial of BBC, that takes us up some very
murky alleys. Should journalists in the SABC endorse apartheid because of their
initials? Was it the duty of all German broadcasters to support democratically-
elected Adolf Hitler? If British journalists (especially those employed by the non-
commercial BBC which is, remember, Britain's primary source of broadcasting) do
not take unto themselves the right to adopt a viewpoint outside the boundaries of
the State, then the British citizen may easily find himself in the same position as
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but, given his position, Lord Annan's views are quite significant.
To the credit of the British press and media, however, they seem to
retain a great deal of independence and impartiality. In 1988 the Gov-
ernment tried to pressure the IBA into initially withholding a program
entitled "Death on the Rock," a documentary about British soldiers who
killed three IRA members on Gibraltar. The IBA rebuffed the Govern-
ment.150 For its part, the BBC may be intimidated by the Government
on occasion and may be prohibited from showing certain programs, but
it is not a propaganda arm of the Government. The BBC, as well as
other radio and television networks, do air views critical of the Govern-
ment and its policies. A notable example involves the BBC's coverage of
the Falklands War. Members of the Government criticized the
BBC coverage for its failure to take a partisan approach in support of
the British government. They chastised the BBC for not referring to
troops and ships as "our" troops and ships, but simply as "British"
troops and ships.1 51 The BBC even raised questions as to whether the
Government's account of events was entirely accurate.1 52 Moreover, in
response to the current Broadcasting Ban, BBC employees threatened to
strike for one day. Both the BBC and IBA protested the Ban.15 1
Nevertheless, the British Government's ability to control the media is
troubling. A government that can control the press can manipulate pub-
lic opinion, and a government that can manipulate public opinion can
more easily impose its will. This is particularly true in Britain, where
the primary check on governmental abuse is political. The fact that Brit-
ain has a very entrenched government further compounds the situation.
The Conservatives have been in power since 1979, and they now hold a
substantial majority in the House of Commons. There is every reason to
believe at this time that they will retain power for the foreseeable fu-
ture. Such a government may be more able to intimidate the media, or
to impose outright restrictions like the Broadcasting Ban, than a govern-
ment with a smaller majority.
Perhaps proposed changes in the British broadcast system will allevi-
the subjects of totalitarian regimes: supplied only with those bits of information
which suit the State. In other words, propaganda.
Dunkley, Whose State Is It Anyway?, Financial Times (London), Nov. 23, 1988, at 31,
cols. 1 & 2.
150. Glencross Interview, supra note 27.
151. See, e.g., Annan, supra note 147, at col. 2.
152. Id.
153. Cf Clements, Britain: Main Irish Nationalist Party Banned From Television,
Interpress Service, Oct. 19, 1988.
1989]
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
ate these problems." 4 At present, there are only four television stations
in Britain. In November 1988 the Home Office issued a proposal that
would dramatically increase the number of stations, 5" some of which
would be based outside Britain. 56 The Government will have difficulty
maintaining tight control over this larger number of stations and their
news coverage, but the Government believes it will be able to maintain
its control 57 and to restrict media news coverage as it did in the case of
the Broadcasting Ban.'
154. Broadcasting White Paper, supra note 20, at 1-2 (The government's proposals
include authorization of a new channel, restructuring of ITV, more news coverage on
ITV, a new regime for cable and microwave transmissions, more direct satellite broad-
casting channels, liberalization of access to funding for all television services, an increased
role for independent producers in program making, deregulation and expansion of inde-
pendent radio, and reform of private sector transmission arrangements. Possibly more
restrictive governmental proposals include subjection of all U.K. television and radio ser-
vices to "taste, decency. and balance" obligations, statutory authorization for the Broad-
casting Standards Council and removal of the broadcasting exemption from obscenity
legislation.).
155. The Government proposes to create a fifth national channel. Id. at I. It also
proposes to develop "a new flexible regime for the development of multi-channel local
services through both cable and microwave transmission . I..." d. (emphasis in
original).
156. Actually, British viewers presently receive some signals generated outside of the
United Kingdom. However, they must have an expensive satellite dish to do so. The
Government proposes to allow this situation to continue. "Viewers will continue to be
able to receive other satellite services directly, including those from the proposed me-
dium-powered Astra and Eutelsat II satellites . . . ." Id. at 1 (emphasis in original).
There are British satellite stations as well. Id. Technically, the Ban probably does not
encompass the satellite television broadcasters and their cable systems. Section 44 of the
Broadcasting Act of 1984 incorporates the power to make banning orders to the Satellite
Broadcasting Board, but, at the time of the Ban, the Board had not yet been established.
Although no equivalent power exists to make banning orders to the Cable Authority, on
the day after the Home Office Order, the Authority issued a similar direction to cable
licensees. See Times (London), Oct. 22, 1988, at 11, col. 3 (Letter to Editor from Chair-
man of the Cable Authority). The net effect, therefore, is that the Ban potentially covers
all broadcasting into the United Kingdom. See Michael, supra note '121, at 787.
157. The Government concludes that, with respect to stations located outside of Brit-
ain, "[siteps will be taken to ensure that the programme content of all such services is
supervised." Broadcasting White Paper, supra note 20, at 1.
158. The White Paper provides that:
It was partly with the power and impact of television and radio in mind that the
Government decided in October 1988 to direct the BBC and the IBA not to broad-
cast direct statements by representatives of terrorist organisations, or their apolo-
gists, connected with Northern Ireland. Such appearances had caused offence to
many viewers and listeners, and had also provided a public platform to propagate
terrorism. It was right that this should be ended. The national interest requires
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It is important to emphasize that most examples of governmental me-
dia control relate to Northern Ireland. The situation there is unique and
difficult. But the instances reveal how the Government can, and does,
control the media. It is difficult to know how often or how effectively the
Government manipulates media cove'rage on other issues.
C. Governmental Restrictions on Information Gathering
The British Government also controls -the media and the press
through restrictions on their ability to gather information.'59 In the
United States, the press and media can gain fairly easy access to much
government information under the Freedom of Information Act.'6 No
comparable act exists, however, in Britain; the Government can withhold
or release information as it sees fit.' 6 ' Even so, officials can be ac-
comodating, Home Office officials provided us with copies of official doc-
uments relating to the Broadcasting Ban without inquiry into our posi-
tion on the Ban. But it refused to divulge a copy of the clarification letter
on the Ban's scope.
16 2
The Government can also control the availability of information under
the Official Secrets Act of 1911,163 which makes it a crime to disclose
that such powers should be provided to the Government and for this reason it is
proposed that they should be continued in any future broadcasting legislation.
Such arrangements are compatible with the proposals to introduce a less regulated
framework for broadcasting.
Id. at 36.
159. See generally P. BIRKINSHAW, FREEDOM OF INFORAMTION: THE LAW, THE
PRACTICE AND THE IDEAL (1988).
160. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982). R. BOYLE, ARTICLE 19: INFORMATION, FREEDOM AND
CENSORSHIP (1988).
161. In Britain, getting access to official information is often quite difficult. One re-
cently published book summarized the situation as follows:
A counterpart of the virtues of impartiality and anonymity is the occupational vice
of secrecy, of which the civil service is continually accused despite the vast number
of informative publications which it issues. The official reluctance to allow the
public to see departmental papers of any kind had serious consequences for the
law as to the production of documents in court, and it retarded the valuable reform
of publishing the reports of inspectors after public inquiries. It is only on very
exceptional occasions that there is any public inquiry into the actions of named
officials, as happened in the Crichel Down affair of 1954 and in the inquiry into
the Vehicle and General Insurance Company's collapse in 1971. Such inquiries,
which necessarily involve breaking, the normal rules of anonymity, can only act as
a further spur to official reticence.
H.W.R. WADE, supra note 44, at 62-63 (footnotes omitted).
162. See supra note 28.
163. Official Secrets Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 28, as amended by Official Secrets
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information from official sources "regardless of the question whether the
public interest really demands secrecy.""' This Act has had only limited
effect, however, as the Government has had difficulty obtaining convic-
tions under it.'
The Government also imposes "confidentiality" obligations on some
employees, and it has tried to use these obligations to stifle the disclosure
of information. The most celebrated example involved the book Spy-
catcher.166 The British Government's efforts to suppress this book began
in 1985 and did not conclude until late 1988.7 The book contained the
memoirs of Mr. Peter Wright, who was a member of M15, Britain's
equivalent of the CIA. The Government believed that disclosures made
in the book would damage both MI5 and national security. 6 ' Accord-
ingly, it engaged in extensive efforts -to prevent publication and distribu-
tion of the book. It first brought suit in Australia but lost.' It then
contemplated suit in the United States when Wright decided to publish
the book there. Advised that the first amendment to the United States
Constitution doomed any such suit, the Government abandoned this
idea. 1' As a result, the book was published. Indeed, by August 17, 1987,
some 215,000 copies had been sold. Thereafter, the book topped the best
seller list for some time. 171
Throughout these events, and even afterward, the British Government
went to great lengths to prevent the British people from gaining access
to the book. It sought and obtained injunctions against the Observer and
Guardian newspapers to prevent publication of the book's contents. 1 2
When the Independent, Evening Standard, and London Daily News
published some allegations from the book, the Government had them
held in contempt under the Observer! Guardian injunctions and im-
Act 1920, 10 & 12 Geo. 5, ch. 75, and by Official Secrets Act 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch.
121.
164. See H.R.W. WADE, supra note 44, at 63.
165. Id. at 63-65. The Franks Committee reporting in 1972 described section two as
a "catch all" and a "mess." DEPARTMENT ON SECTION 2 OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS
ACT 1911, 1972, CMND. No. 5104, §§ 17, 18 (1972)). The Act was said to have created
2314 separate offenses. Id. at 254.
166. P. WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER (1987).
167. Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd. [1988] 3 All E.R. 545, 550-58
(1987) (Scott, J., majority opinion for the Chancery Division). The House of Lords
adopted this statement of facts [1988] 3 All E.R. 638.
168. M. TURNBULL, THE SPYCATCHER TRIAL 24 (1988).
169. [1988] 3 All E.R. 545.
170. See ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 1987, at 49-50.
171. TIME, Aug. 17, 1987, at 55.
172. [1988] 3 All E.R. 545, 552-53.
[Vol. 22.1119
NORTHERN IRELAND BROADCASTING BAN
posed substantial fines. The Government did likewise when the Sunday
Times published excerpts from the book at a later time.173 The Govern-
ment decided that trying to prevent importation of the book into Britain
would be impractical and unfeasible, but it did send letters to booksell-
ers telling them they were precluded from displaying (and, presumably,
selling) the book. 17 4 The Government also tried to prevent public librar-
ies from making the book available.'1
5
The matter ultimately worked its way up to the House of Lords,
which refused to sustain the Government's position.17 It held that the
Guardian and the Observer were entitled to report and comment on the
substance of the allegations made in Spycatcher. 7 It also held that the
Sunday Times could serialize the book.' 78 Lord Keith of Kinkel con-
cluded that, in order to stop publication, the Government had to show
that publication would be harmful to the public interest.'7 9 But, in view
of the widespread publication abroad, the Government was unable to
meet its burden.'
The Spycatcher episode offers much insight into the British system.
The press, far from being intimidated by the Government, went to great
lengths to avoid governmental controls. When the Sunday Times pub-
lished the first part of its serialization of the book, it did so knowing full
well that the Government would disapprove. It also knew, in view of the
Government's prior efforts to hold the Independent, Evening Standard,
and London Daily News in contempt, that it was risking a contempt
charge. Nevertheless, the editors decided to publish the excerpts anyway.
The editors kept their intentions silent until it was too late for the Gov-
ernment to prevent publication. They even printed the first edition of
the paper, which came out on the prior evening and which was likely to
be perused by Government officials, without the serialization so that the
Government would not be alerted and try to seek an injunction. Acco-
lades go to the other newspapers as well. They all fought the Govern-
ment in court and produced the legal victory.' 8 '
It is also important to note that it was the British courts that ulti-
mately refused to prevent publication of the book in Britain. But the
173. Id.
174. Id. at 558.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 638.
177. Id. at 643, 647, 654, 665.
178. Id. at 643, 647-48, 655, 667.
179. Id. at 642.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 545, 550-58.
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British courts, though deserving some praise, also deserve criticism. They
prevented publication of the book for many years. The first injunctions
were issued in 1985 and were not dissolved until 1988.182 In
the interim, British courts held many newspapers in contempt.' 8 In-
deed, they held many newspapers in contempt that were not parties to
the suit in which the injunction was issued, who were not named in the
injunction, and who did not collaborate with the named parties. In addi-
tion, it is unlikely that the British courts would have dissolved the in-
junctions had Spycatcher not been published elsewhere first. It was be-
cause the Australian courts refused to prevent the publication, and
because the British Government assumed that the United States courts
would have refused as well, that the British courts permitted the book
to be published in Britain. 4
The decision does not mean that the Government is prevented from
acting similarly again, only that since in this case the information had so
effectively entered the public domain, a further injunction could serve no
valid purpose. Indeed, the Spycatcher affair has not deterred the British
Government from taking similar actions. After the decision, the Govern-
ment announced that it was blocking distribution of the December 1988
edition of Harper's Magazine."5 The similarities to the Spycatcher epi-
sode were uncanny. Like Spycatcher, the magazine contained the revela-
tions of a former MI5 agent. Once again, those outside Britain had free
access to the information, but the Government wanted to deprive Britons
of access.
D. Defamation Laws
The effectiveness of both the press and the media may be severely
restricted, as well, by Britain's defamation laws. Britain provides only
limited protection to the press and media when they criticize government
officials. In order to recover in an action, a plaintiff need only show that
the press or media made defamatory statements that referred to him. 88
In theory, an additional requirement exists that the statements must have
been maliciously published. But this requirement is, in the words of a
leading commentator, "purely form'al.' 87 "Though the word [mali-
182. Id.
183. For a list of the various opinions rendered, see id. at 545.
184. Id. at 638-68.
185. Int'l Herald Tribune, Nov. 24, 1988, at 2, cols. 5 & 6.
186. See W. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 302-21 (W. Rogers 12th
ed. 1984) (essentials of defamation generally) [hereinafter WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ].
187. Id. at 315.
[Vol. 22:1119
NORTHERN IRELAND BROADCASTING BAN
ciously] is usually inserted in the plaintiff's statement of claim, no one
takes any notice of it at trial except for the purpose of inflating damages
where there has been spite or deliberateness." '188
The media and press do have a privilege of fair comment.' 89 But the
scope of this right is severely limited; it protects only assertions of opin-
ion, and not assertions of fact. 9 ' This is an important distinction. Sup-
pose, for example, the press believes that the Government may have
been involved in illegal or improper conduct. If the press proceeds cau-
tiously in gathering its evidence and accuses government officials
of misconduct, it still might be held liable for defamation. The situation
is compounded by the absence of a Freedom of Information Act'-this
limits the ability of the press and media to gather information and makes
confirming the accuracy of information difficult. Britain recognizes privi-
leges other than fair comment, but virtually all of them require that all
reporting be fair and accurate.' 92
British politicians have been quite successful in their efforts to bring
defamation actions against the press and media. In 1987 a senior con-
servative politician, Norman Tebbitt, brought suit against the BBC for
attributing to him the statement, "Nobody with a conscience votes Con-
servative.' 93 He also brought suit against Mr. Lawrence Knight, Presi-
dent of the National Union of Mineworkers, for making the same state-
ment.9 Against the BBC, Mr. Tebbit received £2,000 plus costs.' 95 In
1986 five Conservative Members of Parliament brought suit against the
BBC for allegations made in its Panorama program. 96 The allegations
linked the Members of Parliament to extreme racist groups that were
allegedly trying to infiltrate the Tory party.197 In the program, the BBC
used pictures of the National Front, of Nazi regalia, and of music asso-
ciated with fascism.' 98 The BBC settled the suits. Two Members of Par-
liament received approximately £300,000 (about $540,000) in damages
188. Id.; Cf. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (U.S. treatment of
libel outlined).
189. WINFIELD & JOLOWICZ, supra note 186, at 324-33.
190. Id. at 324-25.
191. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
192. WINFIELD & JoLowicz, supra note 186, at 333-45.
193. Times (London), Dec. 17, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
194. Times (London), Dec. 18, 1987, at 5, col. 8.
195. Times (London), Dec. 17, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
196. Times (London), July 20, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
197. Id.
198. Times (London), Dec. 14, 1986, at 2, cols. 7, 8.
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and legal fees and an apology.119 The other Members of Parliament re-
ceived undisclosed amounts. 20
0
Perhaps the most important defamation action in Britain was a suit by
Mr. Jeffrey Archer against The Star newspaper. Mr. Archer, a famous
author and playwright, was also a Deputy Chairman of the Conservative
Party.201 The Star alleged that he had paid a prostitute £70 to have
intercourse with him.202 Mr. Archer sued The Star and won £500,000
($850,000).203 This amount was a record for a defamation action
in Britain.204
In addition to being susceptible to a civil action, the press and media
may be criminally prosecuted for libel. The elements of the crime dif-
fer from that of the tort20 5 in certain respects disadvantageous to defend-
ants. For example, whereas truth is a complete defense in tort, the dfe-
fendant in a criminal prosecution must prove not only that the statement
is true but also that the public would benefit from publication.0 6 Also,
uncertainty exists as to whether the defense of fair comment applies in a
criminal trial, although it would be a defense in a tort action. 0 To
some extent, the risk of vexatious prosecution under this common
law offense is mitigated by the requirement that the leave of a judge is
necessary before a newspaper may be prosecuted, 208 but the offense has
nonetheless been used in recent years to prosecute the press. For exam-
ple, in 1976 a well-known public figure initiated a criminal prosecution
against a satirical magazine that he alleged had seriously defamed
him.209
Assessing the impact of these suits and judgments is difficult. It is rea-
sonable to expect that the press and media, faced with the possibility of
substantial damage awards, will be somewhat inhibited in their coverage
of governmental policies and governmental officials. But there is no way
199. Times (London), July 20, at 1, col. 4.
200. Id.
201. Times (London), Mar. 21, 1987, at 2, col. 1.
202. Times (London), July 25, 1987, at 1, col. 4.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. J. SMITH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 822 (6th ed. 1988).
206. See id. at 824.
207. This is the effect of section 6 of the Criminal Libel Act 1843. See id. at 824.
208. Law of Libel Amendment Act 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., ch. 64, § 8.
209. Goldsmith v. Pressdram Ltd. [1977] 1 Q.B. 83(1976), [1977] 2 All E.R. 557. In
modern times, a newspaper has also been successfully prosecuted for the common law
offense of blasphemy. Whitehouse v. Gay News Ltd. 1979 App. Gas. 617 (editor was
fined £500 and the newspaper £1,000).
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to be sure that these suits have had the effect. Many British newspapers
are sensationalist and seem to be unaffected by the threat of liability.
Perhaps the press regards the possibility of suit as simply a cost of doing
business. Perhaps sufficient competition exists between newspapers
and media organizations that they feel they must be aggressive, notwith-
standing the threat of libel suits, in order to survive. But how many
large damage awards can a press or media organization pay out? Ex-
pected changes in defamation law designed to limit the size of judgments
may alleviate this problem. But at present, British defamation law may
pose some constraints on the British media.
VII. CONCLUSION
The fact that the British do not have a system of judicial review raises
interesting questions about the need for judicial review in the United
States.21 On first glance, one might conclude that Britain functions
quite well without judicial review. Britain is a relatively free society.
Britons have most rights that United States citizens deem fundamental.
But a closer analysis reveals that Britain constrains individual liberties,
and controls the press and media, much more than is done in the United
States.2 '
There is no way to know for sure whether the discrepancy between
the level of rights provided in Britain and the level of rights provided in
the United States is attributable to the absence of judicial review in Brit-
ain. No empirical tests have been performed, and it is doubtful whether
a valid test could be done. What is clear is that the British system gives
politicians broad control over fundamental rights, including freedom of
speech and of the press, subject only to political constraints. Politicians
may be less protective of individual rights. Faced with difficult problems,
politicians may see a solution in the restriction of civil liberties. More-
over, politicians may wish to repress a critical press or media. An inde-
pendent judiciary, backed up by a written constitution and judicial re-
view authority, might be more protective of individual liberties.212 This
has been the United States experience.
210. The debate over the need for a British bill of rights has produced a great deal of
literature. In particular, see M. ZANDER, supra note 69, at 268-79; M. ZANDER, A BILL
OF RIGHTS? (2d. ed. 1985); [hereinafter ZANDER, BILL OF RIGHTS]; Lee, supra note 41.
211. "Freedom of speech in England is at most a negative concept-the residue of
freedom which is left after subtracting the controls of libel, contempt of court, official
secrecy legislation, confidentiality, and so on." Bevan, supra note 13, at 63.
212. For British concerns over the expanded judicial power that would result from a
bill of rights, see ZANDER, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 210, at 3-4.
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Britain's approach, despite its deficiencies, is not without its advan-
tages. Britain limits judicial intervention out of respect for the democratic
process. In a representative democracy, this is arguably desirable. In the-
ory, if the people dislike what the Government is doing, they can vent
their concerns through the medium of public opinion or at the polls. In
the United States, there is a distrust of too much democracy. The Fram-
ers built checks into the Constitution to limit the democratic process.
Moreover, the United States judicial review system has its disadvan-
tages. Many believe that the judiciary goes too far; in the guise of pro-
tecting constitutional rights and fundamental freedoms, the judiciary im-
poses its will, thereby displacing legitimate legislative determinations.
In the final analysis the British system does not offer convincing proof
that judicial review is unnecessary. The absence of review gives rise to
many new and troubling problems. In Britain, the only effective check
on governmental abuse is public opinion, with ultimate resort to the bal-
lot box.213 But whether this check can effectively control governmental
abuse or protect individual rights is questionable. The British Govern-
ment has the means to limit and control the flow of information to the
people, and therefore can limit or control the impact of public opinion
on important issues. Legitimate questions arise regarding whether the
British press and media would develop, or be allowed to develop, the
story of a governmental scandal such as Watergate. Newspaper develop-
ment of that story took place over a long period of time. Early articles
were based on anonymous sources as well as on speculation and innu-
endo. Confidentiality of sources was critical if reporters were to obtain
further information. Would British broadcasters have been willing to
make allegations based on so little evidence? Would the media and the
press have feared civil and criminal defamation actions? Moreover, even
if the press and media had come forward with such allegations, would
the Government have tried to intervene with "D" notices, injunctions,
intimidation, or orders not to report?
213. This, of course, assumes that the public knows of the governmental'abuse, i.e.,
that the press tells the public when the Government forces it to withhold information and
that the public perceives and is able to respond to the threat posed to individual rights.
"[Tihe defense of press freedom in the United Kingdom must always invariably rely
upon self-advertisement from the press itself. This normally takes the form of ... pious
editorial indignation . . . ; such indignation wins few committed allies for reform."
Bevan, supra note 13, at 68-69.
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